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goods" for the good life, yet insist that the social order that best promotes 
them is totalitarian. Stoics in pursuit of apatheia tend to depreciate the need 
for the physical, psychological, and social goods Kekes sees as essential to 
any reasonable account of the good life. They also insist that the emotions 
and virtues prized in a Christian conception of wisdom ought to be sup-
pressed. In short, the "human point of view," as Kekes calls it, does not 
offer a sufficiently objective content to stave off radically incommensurable 
accounts of moral wisdom and justice. The differences among different 
virtue traditions jeopardize the prospects for agreement and cooperation 
that Kekes's account of justice requires. 
I found Kekes's book melancholy, at times even grim in its tone, taking 
on some of the coloration of the Greek tragedies from which he draws so 
many lessons. "The fact remains," he writes "that permanent adversities 
may ruin a life no matter how much moral wisdom the person living it has" 
(p. 223). And when these forces overwhelm us and others we care about, we 
are supposed to draw comfort from knowing that we did what we could to 
resist them. Our misforhme is "just the accident of having stumbled into the 
path of the blind, impersonal, indifferent juggernaut of the natural world" 
(p. 223). Kekes's book provides a clear contrast to Christian and other reli-
gious accounts of moral wisdom, and for that reason contributes important-
ly to what I hope is a growing literature on the subject. 
Due to a typesetting error in our July 1998 issue, the fol/owing review was not included 
in its entirety. The complete review follows below. The Editors sincerely regret the error. 
God, Knowledge & Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology, by Peter van 
Inwagen. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. 284. $17.95. 
FRANCES & DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER, Western Washington 
University & Seattle Pacific University 
This volume collects nine essays published by Peter van Inwagen 
between 1977 and 1995. Part I features, among other things, modal skep-
ticism with respect to ontological arguments and arguments from evil. 
Part II addresses certain tensions Christians may feel between modern 
biology, critical studies of the New Testament, and the comparative 
study of religions, on the one hand, and Christian orthodoxy, on the 
other. Part III deploys a formal logic of relative identity to model the 
internal consistency of the orthodox doctrines of the Trinity and the 
Incarnation. In what follows, we summarize and reflect on five essays.' 
"Ontological Arguments" focuses on valid arguments by that name 
which claim or imply that a necessary, concrete being is possible. But how 
are we to tell whether necessary existence (N) is compatible with concrete-
ness (C)? Conceptual analysis won't do, says van Inwagen; for, firstly, the 
compatibility of Nand C is not a conceptual matter and, secondly, even if 
it were, analysis would help no more than it would help settle whether 
'7777' appears in the decimal expansion of re. Perhaps we should beheve N 
is compatible with C anyway, since the possibility is not conceptually pre-
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cluded; but, says van Inwagen, that's like arguing that we should believe 
that three-foot-thick sheets of iron could be transparent to visible light 
since the possibility isn't conceptually precluded-which is absurd. More 
plausibly, perhaps we may rationally believe that Nand C are compatible, 
even though it is false that we should. This is Plantinga's line: without argu-
ment, we rationally believe that there is a possible world in which unsurpass-
able greatness is exemplified (which is just Nand C reved up with perfection) 
provided we still find it compelling upon examining objections. These con-
ditions are insufficient for rational belief, argues van 1nwagen (35-41). That 
was in 1977. In 1985, Plantinga wrote: "I hope sometime soon to reply to 
van Inwagen".' Thirteen years later, we are still waiting. 
Van Inwagen concludes that, barring special revelation, we can't tell 
whether a necessary, concrete being is possible. This skepticism about 
extra-mundane modal matters-an affront to many, a breath of refresh-
ing candor to others-permeates the book. Lest it be dismissed as yet 
another heroic attempt by a theist to save his theism, we note that van 
Inwagen embraced it long before he became a Christian, he deploys it 
fairly and, he offers good reason for it (11-14, 19-21, 30-41, 79-86). 
In "The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God," van Inwagen 
sketches a picture of God's relation to the world according to which ele-
mentary particles exist and have their causal powers because and only 
because God holds them continuously in existence and constantly supplies 
them with these powers. Occasionally, God may miraculously supply these 
particles with different causal powers simply by "decree". How might 
chance fit into this picture? An event which is due to chance, says van 
Inwagen, is one which "is without purpose or significance; ... not part of 
anyone's plan; it serves no one's end; and it might very well not have 
been" (50). This seems odd. For if this is what chance is, vou would not 
expect van Inwagen to classify events brought about by free human choic-
es as chance events, which he does. This may not matter, however. For he 
is mainly concerned with events that are not part of God's plan, and free 
human choices fit that description. "God's plan" is the sum total of what 
God has decreed, excluding decrees issued in response to events that are 
not part of His plan. Within this picture, two sources of chance other than 
human free choice might arise: natural indeterminism and the initial state 
of the world. The latter idea is this: if two possible initial states of the uni-
verse-X and Y-could have served God's purposes equally well, then He 
decrees "Let either X or Y be," one of which results. Van Inwagen rejects the 
alternative-God's either decreeing "Let X be" or decreeing "Let Y be"-
because if X and Y were equally satisfactory to God, then, if He chose X 
rather than Y, His choice would be entirely arbitrary; but "I find it wholly 
incongruous to suppose that the Divine Nature contains anything remotely 
resembling a coin-tossing mechanism" (59). We don't see the alleged 
incongruity. Which perfection would be sullied if God were, by nature, 
disposed to decree arbitrarily between equally satisfactory states of affairs? 
Van 1nwagen speculates that much is due to chance, incuding much 
suffering. By itself, this does not solve the so-called problem of evil, but 
it does have the following moral: "Do not attempt any solution to this 
problem that entails that every particular evil has a purpose, or that, 
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with respect to every individual misfortune, ... God has some special rea-
son for allowing it." (65). This has important implications for arguments 
from evil that appeal to particular horrors. For example, William Rowe 
and Bruce Russell argue that since God must have a reason to permit this 
fawn's or this child's suffering (or something comparably bad) and there 
is no such reason, God does not exist. Critics tend to question the second 
premise, but van Inwagen rejects the first. God need have no special rea-
son to permit a particular horror, provided He has a general reason to 
permit a good deal of suffering. To suppose otherwise is like supposing 
that even if a commander has a general reason to permit his soldiers to 
suffer, he must have a special reason to permit that soldier's suffering. 
No one has replied to this point. That's understandable, however. 
Contrast the rhetorical power of "There is no reason for God to permit 
this fawn's being burned or that girl's being brutalized" with 'There is 
no reason for God to permit a good deal of horrific suffering". 
"The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil" offers a general 
reason for God to permit human suffering: God created us in His own 
image, rational and capable of loving Him. This love, our highest good, 
is impossible without the ability to withhold it. So to fit us for love of 
Himself, God gave us the power to reject Him. And that's what our 
ancestors did, thereby ruining themselves morally and intellectually. 
They began to harm one another and lost their aboriginal power to pro-
tect themselves from the potentially destructive forces of nonhuman 
nature. This condition-their wickedness and helplessness-has persist-
ed through all the generations, being somehow hereditary. 
One worry here is that God Himself exhibits the best sort of love and 
yet God can do no evil. But then, freedom to love and essential goodness 
are compatible; thus, God could have achieved the highest good for His 
creatures without permitting eviU In response, one might distinguish 
love at its best in an essentially good divine being from love at its best in 
a creature made for love of God, and then argue that while the latter 
requires the ability to withhold love, the former does not, and hence that 
the worry is logically invalid. We've yet to see this line of thought 
worked out. Also, that wickedness is somehow hereditary is puzzling, 
especially if we think of it as genetic. It is not a natural consequence of a 
parent's free choice that her child be genetically disposed to behave sim-
ilarly. To this, van Inwagen replies that "it is possible to construct mod-
els of the Fall according to which its hereditary aspect is due to the 
effects of unaltered genes operating under conditions for which they 
were not 'designed'-namely, conditions attendant upon separation 
from God." Unfortunately, he leaves this tantalizing suggestion unde-
veloped. 
A more substantial worry is this: "How could evil of such types and 
quantity and duration and distribution be necessary for God's plan of 
Atonement? Or, if all this evil is not necessary for God's plan, why does 
He not eliminate most of it and make do with that residue of evil that is 
really necessary?" (103). These questions presuppose that there is a mini-
mum amount of evil required for God's purposes. But this is false, says 
van Inwagen. For any amount of evil that would have served God's pur-
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poses, slightly less would have done the job. Thus, if God's purposes 
required the permission of evil, we cannot insist that He should not have 
allowed any more than was necessary for those purposes. In that case, 
God cannot be criticized for not getting by with slightly less evil, even 
though slightly less would have sufficed. 
This is an ingenious and puzzling idea. In the general introduction to 
Part 1, van Inwagen extrapolates, saying that goods are vague. Why 
believe that? He writes: "No doubt the fact that some goods are vague-
I should think that just about all of them are-is a consequence of the 
fact that just about all the concepts we employ outside formal logic and 
pure mathematics are vague" (16, n4). But the fact that our concepts are 
vague does not imply that things are vague; nor does it imply that the 
goods God desires are vague. Our concepts are vague because we can-
not perceive fine gradations of difference, a defect God lacks. 
This stuff about vagueness does not get to the heart of the argument 
from evil anyway, as van Inwagen acknowledges. For suppose God's 
purposes require the permission of a good deal of horrific evil but no 
precise amount; still, if His purposes could have been achieved with a 
lot less suffering, then He would not have permitted so much. Why, 
then, so much rather than a lot less? Because, says van Inwagen, an 
essential part of God's plan is for us to perceive that a natural conse-
quence of our attempting to order our lives on our own is a hideous 
world. Were God to intervene, God would deceive us about the 
hideousness of our living unto ourselves and He would remove the only 
motivation we have for turning to Him. 
We don't see it. For even if, for the reasons mentioned, God must per-
mit most of the natural consequences of our fallenness and hence a great 
deal of suffering, we cannot see why God must permit so much rather 
than a lot less. What would count as a lot less? Well, a world without 
genocide would do. Suppose God prevented our considering genocide, 
ever. Would we be unable to see our hideousness? Would we lack the 
requisite motivation to turn to Him? We can't see why. Our hideousness 
would still be apparent in the vast panoply of nongenocidal activities we 
engage in. But wouldn't God be deceiving us about the natural conse-
quences of our ordering our lives? Yes. But some deception is worth it. 
Think of the matter this way: suppose that unbeknownst to us, God 
would prevent an all-out global nuclear war, even if a natural conse-
quence of our fallen condition were an ability to do it. Should we accuse 
Him of wrongful deception? No. We should fall to our knees and thank 
Him for His great kindness. 
"The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence" 
takes on an evidential argument from evil which goes like this.4 Let'S' 
stand for a proposition describing in detail the amount, kind, and distri-
bution of evil in the world, and let 'HI'-the Hypothesis of 
Indifference-stand for the claim that neither the nature nor the condi-
tion of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent 
actions performed by nonhuman persons. Independent of theodicies, the 
epistemic probability of S on HI is much higher than it is on theism. 
Since theodicies do not significantly raise the epistemic probability of S 
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on theism, it is prima facie more rational to believe HI than theism. To 
defeat this argument, one must have better reason for theism, much bet-
ter than that provided by the argument for preferring HI to theism. 
Van Inwagen denies that the only two viable responses are to give 
theodicies or to give reasons for theism. A third is this: argue that since 
we are in no position to assign any epistemic probability to S on the-
ism-not even a probability-range like 'high' or 'low' or 'middling'-we 
are in no position to make the comparative judgment that S is more like-
lyon HI than on theism. To defend this claim, van Inwagen develops a 
"defense," a story which entails S, is unsurprising given theism, and true 
"for all anyone knows." Since van Inwagen thinks his theodicy for 
human suffering can fill the role he assigns to a defense, the story he 
tells here focuses on the suffering of "the brutes". Here's the gis.t of it: 
1. Every possible world that contains higher-level sentient crea-
tures either contains patterns of suffering morally equivalent to 
those recorded by S, or else is massively irregular. 
2. Some important good depends on the existence of higher-level 
sentient creatures; this good is of sufficient magnitude that it out-
weighs the patterns of suffering recorded by S. 
3. Being massively irregular is a defect in a world, a defect at least 
as great as the defect of containing patterns of suffering morally 
equivalent to those recorded by S. 
(A massively irregular world is a world in which the laws of nature fail in 
a massive way. Two states are morally equivalent if there are no morally 
decisive reasons for preferring one to the other.) 
Do we have any reason to reject this story? We would if we had rea-
son to think that there are possible worlds that are not massively irregu-
lar and which contain higher-level sentient creatures but which contain a 
lot less animal suffering than S describes. But, for all we know, il: is meta-
physically impossible for there to be sentient life without allowing for an 
amount of suffering morally equivalent to that described by S.5 
One might object that even if massive irregularity in a world is a grave 
defect, God could have prevented one awful case of suffering without 
massive irregularity resulting. Thus there are two worlds: the actual 
world and another which is just like it but which lacks that instance of 
suffering. So van Inwagen's proposition 1 is false. This argument presup-
poses that the two worlds are not morally equivalent, that there is a 
morally decisive reason to prefer the second world. "But surely," the 
objector persists, "there is morally decisive reason for God to prefer the 
second; after all, it has one less instance of horrible suffering; moreover, 
the defect of massive irregularity is avoided." This won't do, says van 
Inwagen. There is no sharp line between a world that is massively irregu-
lar and one that is not. So there is no minimum number of cases of animal 
suffering that God could allow to guarantee a world that is not massively 
irregular. So for any particular instance of animal suffering E, if God had 
prevented E, massive irregularity would not have ensued. But, God does 
not thereby have morally decisive reason to prevent E. For if He did, then 
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He would have morally decisive reason to prevent every case of animal 
suffering, and He would thus have morally decisive reason to bring 
about a massively irregular world, which presupposes that the pattern of 
actual animal suffering is a greater defect in a world than massive irregu-
larity-but this last proposition is, for all we know, false. 6 
"Genesis and Evolution" starts by describing two extreme but popular 
views about the relationship between Genesis and evolution. The first, 
that of "genesic literalists," is this: "The planet earth came into existence 
about six thousand years ago, when God created it in a series of six twen-
ty-four-hour days .... Any appearance to the contrary in the geological 
record is due to a worldwide flood that occurred about 4,500 years ago; 
the geological distortions caused by that vast deluge created phenomena 
that the clever and perverse have-like someone finding internal evi-
dence of Baconian authorship in Hamlet-interpreted as showing that the 
earth is not thousands but thousands of millions of years old .... 117 The sec-
ond, that of the 'saganists', is entirely naturalistic and disparages religion. 
Impatient with both, van Inwagen believes that the Bible is divinely 
inspired; still, one ought not to interpret the early chapters of Genesis lit-
erally. This position has a respectable history-including Augustine, 
Jerome and Gregory of Nyssa-forestalling the saganistic claim that 
Christians have simply shifted their ground in response to Darwinism. 
But can the Bible be the revealed word of God if it makes so many ele-
mentary mistakes? Van Inwagen argues that Genesis is right about the 
important things like the fact that God created everything and that the 
sun and stars are simply creatures and not objects of worship, and 
wrong about relatively minor details. He insists that being wrong (even 
drastically wrong) about the age of the universe is of little significance. 
Why, one might object, should God be wrong about anything, even rela-
tively minor details? Well, consider the options: God could have com-
municated a perfectly accurate detailed account of creation, or He could 
have communicated a highly abstract account which left out scientific 
detail and inaccuracies. The first would be inaccessible to most humans 
throughout the ages and so would not serve its purpose, i.e. to set the 
stage for the narrative of God's covenant relationship with Israel. The 
second would not be vivid and concrete enough to make much of an 
impression on its readers. Moreover, for God to have ensured that the 
Bible was free of error, He would have had to dictate a story to the early 
Israelites that was utterly at variance with every model provided by 
their own culture and every other culture we know of. 
Van Inwagen's view implies that God intended readers of Genesis to 
interpret it literally, but that He didn't mind them thereby acquiring 
false beliefs. Why not say instead that God intended readers (some, at 
least) to interpret it figuratively? Elements of Genesis 1-3 should suggest 
to someone who doesn't have an ax to grind that it is intended figura-
tively. In that case, God could have communicated important truths 
about the world and our relation to it and its Creator without intending 
to misinform us at all. 
5aganists venture out of their domain to derive from their scientific 
views implications about God, ethics, and the meaning of life. 50 it is fit-
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ting that a philosopher should return the favor. In the second half of the 
essay, van Inwagen raises doubts about natural selection as the sole 
mechanism for the genesis (or differentiation) of phyla and other broad 
taxa. The theory of evolution implies that there should be many exam-
ples of intermediate forms between two distinct biological classes. We 
find none, however, between, say, fish and amphibia, and none but 
ambiguous examples between any pair of supposedly related classes. 
Darwin's own views implied that we would discover a large number of 
intermediate forms after the sort of extensive investigation we have seen 
in the last 100 years. In the absence of such discoveries, some biolo-
gists-e.g., Gould-now claim that species are basically very stable and 
that evolution of a new species takes place relatively quickly in a local-
ized environment under pressure from extreme conditions. This view, 
"punctuated equilibrium," predicts that fossils of intermediate forms 
would be very rare. 
Van Inwagen objects. First, a statistical problem: "Even if there were 
few enough intermediates between fish and amphibians for it to be 
highly improbable that we should have found any of their fossils, it 
could nevertheless be highly probable that we should have found fossils 
of intermediates between some two classes" (148). Moreover, it seems 
impossible that any series of small enough intermediate steps between, 
say, fish and amphibians could contain members each of which was an 
organism with an evolutionary advantage. There are, then, two possibil-
ities: an intelligent being has been guiding evolution, or there is some 
"yet undiscovered mechanism that does the same thing-perhaps not as 
efficiently as an intelligent being, but efficiently enough" (151). Finally, it 
is questionable whether the biological basis for the unlearned cognitive 
capacities of human beings evolved by natural selection from non-
human primates. Our paleolithic ancestors-say, thirty thousand years 
ago-had the same cognitive capacities as we. The saganist says those 
capacities evolved from the ancestors of our paleolithic ancestors. But 
what quality or set of qualities could have both constituted the biologi-
cal basis for the likes of theoretical physics and conferred an evolution-
ary advantage? A natural candidate is "intelligence"; but, ~,ays van 
Inwagen, there is no such thing as intelligence simpliciter. The quality 
that enabled Thomas Mann to write great novels would not, with a dif-
ferent education, have enabled him to discover the general theory of rel-
ativity. 
"Non Est Hick" begins with an extended parody of a popular picture 
of the world religions derived from John Hick. This picture has it that 
the religions agree on essentials, such as the claim that human beings are 
all striving towards a divine reality which is somehow beyond the reach 
of human thought and language. This striving is largely an attempt to 
free ourselves of self-centeredness and achieve 'reality-centeredness'. Of 
course, these different religions disagree about the details, but that is 
exactly what you'd expect given the different socio-economic conditions 
in which they arose. 
Van Inwagen believes that this picture is so fundamentally skewed 
that it isn't worth his time to explain why. Like other forms of relativism 
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and so-called tolerance, this story about religion is offered to orthodox 
theists as the only rational, modern and sophisticated approach to the 
variety of religious belief. Van Inwagen undertakes to show Christians a 
more reasonable response to religious diversity. 
He starts with the traditional account of God as personal and perfect 
in love and power, who created human beings in His image-which 
meant giving them freedom and the capacity to know Him. Crucial to 
this account is the Fall. We freely turned away from God and as a result 
are somehow ruined. He compares our condition to that of a large mod-
ern city which has been lifted several yards into the air and then 
dropped. Almost all of the buildings are in ruin, although some--entire-
ly by chance-are more habitable than others. We are like the buildings. 
What traces of our original intellectual, moral and spiritual capacities we 
retain is largely a matter of chance. That we retain any spiritual capaci-
ties at all explains the phenomenon of religion. These capacities are dis-
tributed randomly throughout humanity. There is no reason (thus far) to 
suppose Christians have a better handle on the truth than members of 
other religions. 
Van Inwagen argues that, unlike other religions or nations or institu-
tions, the people of Israel and the Church were deliberately created by 
God. As such, the Church is radically unlike other religious institutions. 
It is part of the Enlightenment agenda, he says, to deny this. He thinks it 
is unique because the Church has been the single most important influ-
ence in the formation of modern Europe, and modern Europe is 
absolutely unique in a number of good and bad ways. No other society 
produced science, the rule of law, the independent judiciary, universal 
suffrage, the concept of human rights, near-universal literacy, world 
wars, hydrogen bombs, and worldwide colonialism. "If a tree bears 
unique fruit, then it is probably a unique tree." 
He anticipates an objection: "Well, isn't it fortunate for you that you 
just happen to be a member of this 'unique instrument of salvation'. I 
suppose you realize that if you had been raised among Muslims, you 
would make similar claims for Islam?" (213). He does realize it; but he 
notes that all interesting beliefs are like this. If we had been born and 
educated differently, we very likely would not have held them. But we 
retain those beliefs, and in many cases, justifiedly. Is this arrogance? Van 
Inwagen responds: " ... [1]f I am to be charged with arrogance, it had bet-
ter not be by the authors of the picture of world religions that I outlined 
at the beginning of this essay. Any of them that flings a charge of arro-
gance at me is going to find himself surrounded by a lot of broken 
domestic glass. I may believe that everything the Muslim believes that is 
inconsistent with what I believe is false. But then so does everyone who 
accepts the law of the excluded middle or the principle of non-contradic-
tion. What I do not do is to inform the Muslim that every tenet of Islam 
that is inconsistent with Buddhism is not really essential to Islam. (Nor 
do I believe in my heart of hearts that every tenet of Islam that is incon-
sistent with the beliefs of late-twentieth-century middle-class Anglo-
American professors is not really essential to Islam.)" 
The essay ends: "If we are Christians we must believe that salvation 
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has not come to humanity through Confucius or Gautama or 
Mohammed. We must believe that the salvation of humanity began with 
events that were quite unrelated to the lives and teachings of these men. 
We must believe that it began when some women standing outside a 
tomb were told, 'He is not here'" (216). 
These are excellent essays. They are at once orthodox and original, 
reaffirming old truths and invigorating them with powerful arguments 
and vivid word-pictures. They are hard-headed, honest and profoundly 
serious, yet frequently witty and occasionally hilarious. 
Van Inwagen dedicates the collection to Alvin Plantinga with the fol-
lowing inscription: 
A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid. 
Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, 
but on a candlestick; 
and it giveth light unto all that are in the house. 
- Matthew 5:14,15 
It lives up to its inscription. 
NOTES 
1. Some readers will be disappointed that much of van Inwagen's other 
writing in the philosophy of religion is omitted. Happily, however, 
Westview Press will soon publish it. 
2. See Plantinga, "Self Profile," in Alvin Plantinga (Dordrecht: Reidel, 
1985),97, n33. 
3. We discuss this in "The Christian Theodicist's Appeal to Love," 
Religious Studies (1993), 185-92. 
4. Paul Draper, "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists," 
Nous (1989), in ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder, The Evidential Argument from Evil 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1996), 12-29. 
5. See the essays by Draper and van Inwagen in The Evidential Argument 
from Evil, 175-92 and 219-34. 
6. See Bruce Russell, "Defenseless," The Evidential Argument from Evil, 
200-201. On page 205, n12, Russell says the claim that there is no minimum 
number of cases of animal suffering that God could allow to guarantee a 
world that is not massively irregular is "irrelevant" to his objection. We just 
showed how it is relevant. See also van Inwagen's remarks on pages 234-35. 
7. Thus van Inwagen puts into the mouth of the genesiac literalist 
words analogous to those of Stratfordians-literary theorists who hold the 
orthodox view of the the authorship of Hamlet-that a glover's son from 
Stratford was its author. An apt analogy, although perhaps a little hard on 
the genesaic literalists, who are not quite as naive and dogmatic as the 
Stratfordians. For more on this important matter, see Charlton Ogbum, The 
Mysterious William Shakespeare (Maclean, Virginia: EPM Publications, Inc. 
1984), Richard Whalen, Shakespeare: Who was He? (Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger: 1994), and Joseph Sobran, Alias Shakespeare (New York: Free Press, 
1997). 
